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Suppose N parties describe the state of a quantum system by N possibly different
density operators. These N state assignments represent the beliefs of the parties
about the system. We examine conditions for determining whether the N state
assignments are compatible. We distinguish two kinds of procedures for assessing
compatibility, the first based on the compatibility of the prior beliefs on which the N
state assignments are based and the second based on the compatibility of predictive
measurement probabilities they define. The first procedure leads to a compatibil-
ity criterion proposed by Brun, Finkelstein, and Mermin [BFM, Phys. Rev. A 65,
032315 (2002)]. The second procedure leads to a hierarchy of measurement-based
compatibility criteria which is fundamentally different from the corresponding classi-
cal situation. Quantum mechanically none of the measurement-based compatibility
criteria is equivalent to the BFM criterion.
I. INTRODUCTION
There are good reasons [1] to view a quantum state not as representing a true state
of affairs, but as a state of knowledge or, more provocatively, a state of belief. This view
corresponds to the Bayesian approach to probability theory, according to which probabilities
are an agent’s necessarily subjective degrees of belief about a set of alternatives. Different
scientists can have different beliefs about the same physical system, resulting in different
quantum state assignments. This can arise for a variety of reasons. For instance, one of
the scientists might have no access or only partial access to another’s measurement results.
In general, N scientists, or parties, can assign N different states, pure or mixed, to a given
system.
In this paper we are not concerned with how to justify a particular state assignment.
Instead, we start from a given set of N states, representing the beliefs of N parties, and
ask for conditions for determining that the N quantum states are compatible (or, conversely,
that they are contradictory). The conditions we derive can be viewed as criteria for the
mutual compatibility of N quantum state assignments.
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2There are two distinct procedures for assessing the compatibility of quantum states (or,
conversely, for uncovering contradictions among the states). The first procedure examines
the firm beliefs on which the parties base their state assignments and asks whether these
beliefs are compatible. This procedure leads to the compatibility criterion proposed by
Brun, Finkelstein, and Mermin (BFM) [2]. The second procedure examines measurement
probabilities predicted by the parties’ state assignments and asks whether these probabilities
are compatible. We show that this second procedure leads to a hierarchy of measurement-
based compatibility criteria. The two-party version of one of our criteria is equivalent to
a compatibility criterion proposed by Peierls [3, 4]; thus this criterion provides an N -party
generalization of Peierls’s criterion, which we call post-Peierls (PP) compatibility.
The BFM compatibility criterion is based on the compatibility of the beliefs of the N
parties. We show that the BFM criterion is not equivalent to any of the measurement-based
compatibility criteria. This means that there is generally no way to use measurements to
confirm the compatibility of states that are BFM compatible or to reveal the incompatibility
of states that are BFM incompatible.
The compatibility criteria we derive can be specialized to classical probabilities by consid-
ering density operators all of which are diagonal in a common eigenbasis—i.e., commuting
density operators—and by restricting the allowed measurement operators to be diagonal in
the same basis. There are interesting differences between the hierarchy of measurement-
based criteria in the classical and quantum cases. Moreover, the classical version of BFM
compatibility is equivalent to the classical version of PP compatibility, in contrast to the
quantum case.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we review briefly the concepts of Dutch-book
consistency and strong Dutch-book consistency, which provide the foundations for Bayesian
probability theory, and define the notions of contradictory beliefs and contradictory proba-
bility assignments. In Sec. III, we derive the BFM compatibility criterion for the quantum
states of N parties from the requirement that there be a state assignment that does not
contradict the belief of any party. Section IV introduces our hierarchy of measurement-
based compatibility criteria and highlights the surprising differences between the classical
and quantum cases. We consider how the measurement-based compatibility criteria change
when one generalizes from measurements described by one-dimensional orthogonal projectors
to POVMs. Section V focuses on PP compatibility, the only one of the compatibility criteria
for which—as far as we can tell—it is not possible to formulate a simple universal mathe-
matical condition applicable to all sets of quantum states in all Hilbert-space dimensions;
we consider nontrivial examples of PP compatibility for three states of a three-dimensional
system. Sec. VI closes the paper with a summary and discussion.
II. CONSISTENT PROBABILITIES AND CONTRADICTORY BELIEFS
The notion of consistent beliefs has its roots in the approach to Bayesian or subjective
probability via consistent betting behavior. Bayesian probabilities quantify one’s degree of
belief in the various alternatives from among a set of possibilities [5]. Bayesian probabilities
are given an operational definition in terms of betting behavior. Suppose that A is willing to
place a bet at odds of (1− p)/p to 1 on the occurrence of some event. This means that A is
willing to pay in a stake px, with the promise of receiving a payoff x if the event occurs and
nothing otherwise. That A considers this to be a fair bet—she is willing to accept the bet at
these odds no matter what the payoff, positive or negative—defines p to be the probability
3that A assigns to the event.
Suppose now that A makes probability assignments to a set of events. We say that A’s
probability assignments are consistent (or Dutch-book consistent) if there exists no set of
bets which she regards as fair, but in which she loses for every outcome that she believes to
be possible. Notice that this is a purely internal consistency criterion; it refers only to A’s
subjective beliefs.
The so-called Dutch-book argument [6, 7] shows that consistency alone implies that A’s
probability assignment must satisfy the usual probability axioms: (i) p ≥ 0, (ii) p(E) = 1
if A believes that event E is certain to occur, (iii) p(E ∨ F ) = p(E) + p(F ) if E and F are
mutually exclusive, and (iv) p(E ∧F ) = p(E|F )p(F ) (Bayes’s rule). In Appendix A we first
review the formulation of Bayesian probabilities in terms of betting behavior and then give
the Dutch-book derivation of the standard probability rules.
Consistency enforces the probability axioms, but it does not dictate particular probability
assignments, leaving these to whatever way A chooses to translate what she knows or believes
into probabilities. The only exception is in the case of certainty, where consistency requires
that all probabilities be 0 or 1. Indeed, a consequence of the probability axioms—it also
follows directly from the Dutch-book argument—is that p = 0 for any outcome that A
believes to be impossible. We call the belief that an outcome is impossible a firm belief.
Surprisingly, consistency does not imply that p > 0 for any outcome that A believes to
be possible. In other words, if A assigns probability zero to an outcome, one cannot infer
from consistency alone that A believes the event to be impossible. To make this inference,
we need a slightly stronger version of consistency: we say that A’s probability assignment
is strongly (Dutch-book) consistent [8, 9] if there exists no bet that she regards as fair in
which there is at least one losing outcome but no winning outcomes among those outcomes
she deems possible. If A’s probability assignment is strongly consistent, then an outcome
has zero probability if and only if she believes it to be impossible (see Appendix A).
Dutch-book consistency has to do with the beliefs and probability assignments of a single
party. Our concern in this paper is compatibility among many parties. We say that the
beliefs ofN parties about a set of alternatives are compatible if there is at least one alternative
that all parties judge to be possible. Conversely, the beliefs of N parties are contradictory (or
incompatible) if they are not compatible in the sense just described, i.e., if every alternative
is deemed impossible by at least one party. Examining the alternatives to determine which
applies is thus guaranteed to contradict at least one party. Contradictory beliefs cannot be
reconciled unless at least one party abandons a firm prior belief.
It is easy to imagine situations that give rise to compatible or to contradictory beliefs.
Take a die as an example. Suppose A has seen the North face of the die, which shows 4
dots. She therefore believes that it is impossible for the top face of the die to show either 3
or 4 dots, but that it is possible for it to show 1, 2, 5, or 6 dots. Suppose B has seen the
East face of the die, which shows 1 dot. He believes that the top face can show 2, 3, 4, or
5 dots, but not 1 or 6. These beliefs are compatible since both parties believe that the top
face can show 2 or 5 dots.
Now suppose that C asserts that the South face of the die shows 5 dots. He believes that
it is impossible for the top face of the die to show 2 or 5 dots, thus contradicting the beliefs
of A and B. This situation could arise if C’s assertion was based on a mistaken observation
from across the room; the beliefs of the three parties could be reconciled by C’s observing
the South face again, finding that it shows 3 dots, and thereby giving up his firm belief that
the top face could not show 2 or 5 dots. Another possibility is that the die was tossed after
4the initial observations by A and B; the beliefs of the three parties could be reconciled if
A and B realized that the die had been tossed after their observations, which would cause
them to abandon their prior firm beliefs.
Under the assumption of strong consistency, where the firm belief that an alternative is
impossible is equivalent to assigning zero probability, the conditions for contradictory and
compatible beliefs can be re-expressed in terms of probabilities. The beliefs (or probability
assignments) of N parties are compatible if and only if there is at least one alternative to
which all parties assign nonzero probability, i.e., there exists a probability assignment that
does not contradict the firm beliefs of any of the parties. This is the classical version of BFM
compatibility. The beliefs (or probability assignments) of the N parties are contradictory
(or incompatible) if and only if every alternative is assigned zero probability by at least one
party.
For ordinary consistency, the existence of one or more alternatives to which all parties
assign nonzero probability is sufficient for compatible beliefs, but it is not necessary, because
a party can assign zero probability to alternatives the party believes are possible. For
ordinary consistency, probabilities do not carry enough information about firm beliefs to
allow compatibility to be determined from the parties’ probability assignments. Since we
are interested in the compatibility of density operators, we need strong consistency so that
probabilities for measurement outcomes generated by the density operators allow one to
determine the firm beliefs of the parties. Therefore we assume strong consistency throughout
the remainder of the paper, except where explicitly noted.
There is a another stronger kind of compatibility for classical probabilities. Suppose, for
example, that in the case of the die, A and B come together, combine their observations,
and thereafter agree that the top face can show 2 or 5 dots, but not 1, 3, 4, or 6 dots. They
generally would not assign the same probabilities to 2 and 5 dots, but they do have the same
firm beliefs, a situation we capture by saying that their new beliefs are in concord. Generally,
we say that the beliefs (or probability assignments) of N parties are concordant if their firm
beliefs coincide, i.e., if they assign zero probability to the same alternatives. Concordant
probability assignments have the same support. It is not reasonable to demand that parties
have concordant probabilities, but they arise naturally when parties with compatible beliefs
share those beliefs.
With this background, we turn now to BFM compatibility for quantum state assignments.
III. BFM COMPATIBILITY
The system under consideration is described by a D-dimensional Hilbert space H. We
label the N parties by an index α = A,B,C, . . . ; their state assignments are denoted by
ρˆα. For a projective measurement in an arbitrary orthonormal basis {|k〉, k = 1, . . . , D},
i.e., a measurement described by orthogonal one-dimensional projectors (we call such a
measurement an ODOP for short), the probability assigned by party α to the outcome k is
given by p
(α)
k = tr(ρˆαΠˆk) = 〈k|ρˆα|k〉, where Πˆk = |k〉〈k|. The case of classical probabilities
is included automatically as the situation in which all the ρˆα are diagonal in the same
orthonormal basis {|k〉}, and the only allowed measurement is a measurement in this basis.
Under the assumption of strong consistency, each party assigns zero probability to pre-
cisely those outcomes he believes cannot occur; i.e., for each α, 〈ψ|ρˆα|ψ〉 = 0 if and only if
party α believes that the outcome corresponding to |ψ〉 is impossible in any measurement
containing |ψ〉. Therefore, each party assigns a density operator ρˆα whose null subspace
5N (ρˆα) consists of all those vectors corresponding to outcomes he believes cannot occur. The
support of a density operator is the orthocomplement of the null subspace. All vectors not
in the null subspace have a component in the support and thus have nonzero probability, so
the party believes that the outcomes corresponding to all such vectors can occur.
A density operator ρˆ contradicts party α’s firm beliefs if 〈ψ|ρˆ|ψ〉 > 0 for some |ψ〉
that α believes to be impossible. Thus ρˆ does not contradict α’s beliefs if and only if
N (ρˆα) ⊆ N (ρˆ). What we want to know is the circumstances under which there is a den-
sity operator that does not contradict the firm beliefs of any of the parties, i.e., a density
operator ρˆ such that N (ρˆα) ⊆ N (ρˆ) for all α. Since N (ρˆ) is a subspace, it follows that
M ≡ span(N (ρˆA),N (ρˆB), . . .) ⊆ N (ρˆ) ⊂ H. Such a ρˆ exists if and only if M is not the
entirety ofH, which is equivalent to saying that the orthocomplement ofM contains at least
one nonzero vector. Since the orthocomplement of M is the intersection of the supports of
the ρˆα, we have the result that there exists a ρˆ that does not contradict any party’s prior
belief if and only if the intersection of the supports of all the ρˆα contains at least one nonzero
vector. This is the criterion for BFM compatibility of state assignments. In the classical case
the BFM criterion reduces to the condition that at least one of the common eigenvectors
has nonzero eigenvalue for all parties.
What we have shown is that BFM compatibility is equivalent to the existence of a density
operator that does not contradict the firm beliefs of any party. Just as in the classical case,
the assumption of strong consistency, as opposed to ordinary Dutch-book consistency, is
essential for this conclusion. The reason is that any set of consistent (but not necessarily
strongly consistent) state assignments can arise from a set of noncontradictory beliefs. Let
ρˆA, ρˆB, . . . be N arbitrary states. These are consistent state assignments for N parties all of
whom believe that any outcome is possible, since consistency alone allows a party to believe
that a vector in his null subspace corresponds to a possible outcome. Obviously, there is a
posterior state ρˆ that does not contradict the firm beliefs of any party; indeed, any posterior
state ρˆ will do. Merely consistent state assignments do not reveal enough about the parties’
prior beliefs to rule out the existence of a noncontradictory posterior state assignment.
Suppose parties with BFM compatible state assignments share their beliefs, each adopting
the firm beliefs of all the others. BFM compatibility guarantees that there are density
operators that are consistent with the firm beliefs of all the parties. The parties will generally
not end up assigning the same density operator, but they will assign density operators that
incorporate the same firm beliefs and thus have the same support. We say such density
operators are concordant in the same sense as for probability assignments.
Our derivation of the BFM criterion is different from the one given by Brun, Finkelstein,
and Mermin [2]. They show that their criterion follows if one assumes that each of the
state assignments ρˆA, ρˆB, . . . “incorporates some subset of a valid body of currently relevant
information about the system, all of which could, in principle, be known by a particularly
well-informed Zeno.” Their formulation suggests that each of the N state assignments should
be consistent with some real state of affairs captured in Zeno’s state ρˆ. This impression is
reinforced shortly thereafter in their paper, where one of the explicit assumptions leading
to the BFM criterion is that “if anybody describes a system with a density matrix ρˆ, then
nobody can find (the system) to be in a pure state in the null space of ρˆ.” In contrast, our
derivation is couched wholly in terms of the beliefs of the parties and does not appeal to a
real state of affairs. It is therefore preferable in a Bayesian approach to quantum mechanics.
6IV. MEASUREMENT-BASED COMPATIBILITY
A. Compatibility conditions
We turn our attention now to compatibility conditions based on the compatibility of
measurement probabilities. We focus first on ODOP measurements, i.e., those described by
complete sets of one-dimensional orthogonal projectors {Πˆk, k = 1, . . . , D}, the probability
party α assigns to outcome k being p
(α)
k = tr(ρˆαΠˆk) = 〈k|ρˆα|k〉. Most importantly, we
assume that all parties agree on this description of the measurement. In Sec. IVC below
we generalize the compatibility conditions to the context of measurements described by
POVMs.
Our hierarchy of measurement-based compatibility conditions can be stated very simply
as whether the parties’ measurement probabilities are compatible or concordant and whether
this holds for all measurements or for at least one measurement. In mathematical language
the compatibility conditions are the following:
∀{Πˆj}∀k
(
(∀α : p(α)k > 0) ∨ (∀α : p
(α)
k = 0)
)
(ES) , (1)
∀{Πˆj}∃k ∀α : p
(α)
k > 0 (PP) , (2)
∃{Πˆj}∀k
(
(∀α : p(α)k > 0) ∨ (∀α : p
(α)
k = 0)
)
(W) , (3)
∃{Πˆj}∃k ∀α : p
(α)
k > 0 (W
′) . (4)
Condition (1), called ES for “equal support,” says that for all measurements and any
outcome Πˆk, either all parties assign nonzero probability to Πˆk, or they all assign zero prob-
ability to Πˆk. In other words, the parties’ probabilities for all measurements are concordant.
It is trivial to see that ES is equivalent to all the density operators ρˆα having the same
support, i.e., being concordant as defined in the preceding section. As a consequence, ES
implies BFM. ES is a very strong compatibility condition, which is violated in many practi-
cal situations, but which arises naturally when parties with BFM compatible beliefs combine
their beliefs.
Unlike ES and BFM, there are fundamental differences between the classical and quantum
versions of the remaining three conditions. Condition (2), called PP for “post-Peierls,” is
implied by ES. It says that for all measurements, there is at least one outcome to which
all parties assign nonzero probability; i.e., all measurements have compatible probabilities.
It is often useful to think in terms of the conditions for violating PP compatibility: PP is
violated if there exists a measurement such that at least one party assigns zero probability
to every outcome; for this measurement the measurement probabilities are contradictory,
the outcome, whatever it is, guaranteed to contradict one or more parties. The two-party
version of PP is the original compatibility condition of Peierls [3, 4]; it is equivalent to
ρˆAρˆB 6= 0. As far as we can tell, the conditions for multi-party PP compatibility cannot
be put in a simple universal mathematical form, unlike the other compatibility criteria. In
Sec. V, we consider nontrivial examples of three-party PP compatibility in three dimensions.
Condition (3), called W for “weak,” says that there is at least one measurement such that
for any outcome Πˆk, either all parties assign nonzero probability to Πˆk, or they all assign
probability zero to Πˆk. In other words, there exists a measurement whose measurement
probabilities are concordant.
7Finally, condition (4), called W′, is implied by W. It states that there is at least one
measurement and at least one outcome for that measurement to which all parties assign
nonzero probability; i.e., there exists a measurement whose measurement probabilities are
compatible.
Summarizing the implications we have identified up till now, we have
ES =⇒ BFM , ES =⇒ PP , W =⇒W′ . (5)
The latter two relations involve only the logical structure of the compatibility conditions;
all the relations hold for both the classical and quantum cases.
In the case of classical probabilities, there is only one allowed measurement—a measure-
ment in the basis that diagonalizes all the ρˆα—so it is clear that ES is equivalent to W
and PP is equivalent to W′. It is equally clear that PP and W′ are equivalent to BFM.
Summarizing the implications for the classical case, we have
Classical probabilities: W⇐⇒ ES =⇒ BFM⇐⇒ PP⇐⇒W′ . (6)
This chain reflects the two kinds of compatibility for classical probabilities: W and ES corre-
spond to the parties having concordant probabilities, whereas BFM, PP, and W′ correspond
to the parties having compatible probabilities.
B. Relations among quantum compatibility conditions
In the quantum case, the relations (6) change in an interesting way to
Quantum states: ES =⇒ BFM =⇒ PP =⇒W′ ⇐⇒W . (7)
Here, unlike the classical case, BFM is stronger than PP, and PP is stronger than W′, but
the most striking difference is that W, the strongest condition classically, is the weakest
condition quantum mechanically. As a matter of fact, W is satisfied by any set of state
assignments, as we show below. The different structure of quantum implications in Eq. (7)
is due to the far greater freedom quantum mechanics allows for measurements.
We now prove the relations (7). The first implication, ES ⇒ BFM, is trivial: equal
support implies that the supports have at least one state in common. It is also clear that
the reverse implication does not hold.
To see that BFM implies PP, consider an arbitrary measurement {Πˆj = |j〉〈j|}. BFM
compatibility is equivalent to saying that M ≡ span(N (ρˆA),N (ρˆB), . . .) is not the entire
Hilbert space H. Since the vectors {|j〉} are an orthonormal basis, at least one outcome |k〉
lies outsideM and thus has a nonzero projection onto the orthocomplement ofM, which is
the intersection of the supports of the ρˆα. For this outcome we have 〈k|ρˆα|k〉 = tr(ρˆαΠˆk) > 0
for all α. To see that PP does not imply BFM, consider two nonorthogonal pure states.
There is no one-shot measurement that can distinguish the two states reliably, so the two
states satisfy PP, but since the intersection of the supports of the two states contains only
the zero vector, the two states violate BFM.
A simple example shows that W′ does not imply PP: two orthogonal pure states violate
PP, but they satisfy W′, as can be seen by considering a measurement in a basis that includes
a vector that lies in the two-dimensional subspace spanned by the two states, but is not equal
to either of them.
8To show that W′ is equivalent to W and is implied by PP, we prove the stronger result
that any set of N states ρˆA, ρˆB, . . . satisfies W, which shows that W follows from any of the
other conditions. We construct a measurement {Πˆj} each of whose projectors has nonzero
overlap with the supports of all the ρˆα. Let |φα〉 be an eigenvector of ρˆα with nonzero
eigenvalue λα. We need to find an orthonormal basis {|k〉} such that 0 < |〈k|φα〉|2 for all
k and α, since this implies 0 < λα|〈k|φα〉|
2 ≤ 〈k|ρˆα|k〉 = tr(Πˆkρˆα) for all k and α, where
Πˆk = |k〉〈k|. Letting S be the set of all state vectors that are orthogonal to at least one
|φα〉, we see that what we need to do is to construct an orthonormal basis none of whose
basis vectors is in S.
To do the construction, we begin by defining the distance between two state vectors,
d(|ψ〉, |χ〉) ≡ cos−1 |〈ψ|χ〉| , (8)
which allows us to define the distance between an arbitrary state vector |ψ〉 and the set S
by
d(|ψ〉, S) ≡ min
|χ〉∈S
d(|ψ〉, |χ〉) . (9)
A state vector |ψ〉 is in S if and only if d(|ψ〉, S) = 0. Our construction relies on the fact
that, arbitrarily close to any vector |χ〉 ∈ S, there exists a vector |ψ〉 that is a finite distance
away from S; i.e., any ǫ-ball around |χ〉 ∈ S contains a vector |ψ〉 such that d(|ψ〉, S) > 0.
Now choose an orthonormal basis {|k〉} such that d(|1〉, S) > 0. Assume that d(|k〉, S) = 0
for at least one of the basis vectors—otherwise we have the desired basis—and let |m〉 be
the first such basis vector in the list, i.e., d(|m〉, S) = 0 and d(|k〉, S) > 0 for k < m. We
now show that the basis can be rotated in such a way that d(|k〉, S) > 0 for k ≤ m. Define
ǫ =
1
2
min
k<m
d(|k〉, S) . (10)
Let |m′〉 be a state such that d(|m′〉, |m〉) ≡ d < ǫ and d(|m′〉, S) = δ > 0. Then there exists
a unitary operator Uˆ such that |m′〉 = Uˆ |m〉 and d(|k〉, Uˆ |k〉) < ǫ for all k < m. To see this,
let |m′〉 = |m〉eiµ cos d+ |m⊥〉 sin d, with 〈m⊥|m〉 = 0. We can use
Uˆ ≡ |m′〉〈m|+ |m′⊥〉〈m⊥|+ 1− |m〉〈m| − |m⊥〉〈m⊥| ,
where |m′⊥〉 ≡ −|m〉e
iµ sin d + |m⊥〉 cos d, for which it follows that cos d(|k〉, Uˆ |k〉) =
|〈k|Uˆ |k〉| = |1 − |〈k|m⊥〉|2(1 − cos d)| ≥ cos d. Now define |k′〉 = Uˆ |k〉 for all k. Then
d(|k′〉, S) > ǫ for k < m, and therefore d(|k′〉, S) > 0 for k ≤ m. By repeating this proce-
dure, one arrives at a basis with the property that each basis state is a finite distance from
S, as required.
C. Generalized measurements
In this subsection we investigate how the compatibility criteria change if generalized
measurements, described by POVMs, are included in the allowed measurements. A POVM
is a collection of positive operators {Eˆb} satisfying
∑
b Eˆb = 1ˆ; the probability assigned by
party α to outcome b is p
(α)
b = tr(ρˆαEˆb).
It is clear that BFM is not affected by generalizing to POVMs, since it is phrased in
terms of firm beliefs, not in terms of measurements. For the measurement-based criteria, it is
9logically possible that states that are W or W′ incompatible relative to ODOPs can be made
compatible by including additional measurements; indeed, the uninformative measurement
with a single outcome does make all states W and W′ compatible. Since all states are already
W and W′ compatible under ODOPs, however, allowing POVMs makes no difference to W
and W′. It is also possible that states that are ES or PP compatible relative to ODOPs
can be made incompatible by including additional measurements. It is clear, however, that
density operators with the same support satisfy ES compatibility with POVMs included
among the measurements; thus allowing POVMs makes no difference to ES compatibility.
The only compatibility criterion that is affected by generalizing to POVMs is PP. We
distinguish the two kinds of post-Peierls compatibility by using PP-ODOP to denote com-
patibility relative to ODOPs and PP-POVM to denote compatibility relative to POVMs.
Clearly PP-POVM implies PP-ODOP. To investigate PP-POVM, it is easiest to focus on
the conditions for violating PP-POVM: PP-POVM is violated if there exists a measurement,
described by a POVM {Eˆb}, such that at least one party assigns zero probability to every
outcome b.
Given any POVM, we can write the POVM elements Eˆb in terms of their eigendecompo-
sitions, thus obtaining a finer-grained POVM consisting of rank-one operators. If a POVM
{Eˆb} shows that a set of density operators violates PP-POVM compatibility, then the under-
lying rank-one POVM reveals the same incompatibility. Thus, in investigating PP-POVM,
we can restrict attention to rank-one POVMs. Moreover, since a rank-one POVM can be
extended to an ODOP in a higher-dimensional Hilbert space (the Neumark extension) [10],
the question of the PP-POVM compatibility of a set of states is equivalent to the question
of whether the states are PP-ODOP compatible when they are embedded in a Hilbert space
of arbitrary dimension.
The condition for two-party PP-ODOP compatibility, ρˆAρˆB 6= 0, is independent of the
dimension in which the two states are embedded, so it is also equivalent to PP-POVM com-
patibility [4]. The case of two nonorthogonal pure states, which are PP-POVM compatible,
but not BFM compatible, establishes that PP-POVM is not equivalent to BFM.
States of a two-state system (qubit) illustrate the difference between PP relative to
ODOPs and POVMs. Since density operators of full rank give nonzero probabilities for
all measurement outcomes, they can be added to or removed from a set of density operators
without affecting the PP compatibility of the other density operators in the set. For a qubit
this means that we only need to consider the situation in which the parties assign pure
states ρˆα =
1
2
(1ˆ + nα · σˆ), α = 1, . . . , N , where nα is the (unit) Bloch vector for party α’s
pure state. Two pure states are PP compatible, relative to either ODOPs or POVMs, if
and only if they are not orthogonal. Three or more distinct pure states in two dimensions
are PP-ODOP compatible if and only if no two of the states are orthogonal. PP-POVM
compatibility is more complicated. The states are incompatible if and only if there is a
POVM such that each outcome has zero probability for at least one of the states. Such a
POVM must consist of rank-one positive operators, each of which is orthogonal to one of
the pure states ρˆα, i.e., Eˆα = qα(1ˆ − nα · σˆ), where 0 ≤ qα ≤ 1/2. Requiring the POVM
elements to sum to 1ˆ implies that the qα’s are a normalized probability distribution and that
the Bloch vectors average to zero:
0 =
∑
α
qαnα . (11)
The result is that a set of pure states in two dimensions is PP-POVM compatible if and only
if the convex set generated by the Bloch vectors does not contain zero or, equivalently, the
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convex set generated by the states ρˆα does not contain the maximally mixed state 1ˆ/2. These
results for a two-state system establish that PP-ODOP is not equivalent to PP-POVM.
We are left with the following chain of implications:
Quantum states: ES =⇒ BFM =⇒ PP-POVM =⇒ PP-ODOP =⇒W′ ⇐⇒W . (12)
It is interesting to compare these relations to what happens to the classical relations (6) when
one generalizes to the coarse-grained measurements that are POVMs diagonal in the common
eigenbasis of the density operators. ES still corresponds to concordant probabilities, BFM
and PP still correspond to compatible probabilities, but the uninformative measurement
makes all probabilities compatible under W and W′. Thus we have the following classical
implications when we allow coarse-grained measurements:
Classical probabilities: ES =⇒ BFM⇐⇒ PP =⇒W′ ⇐⇒W . (13)
When we generalize to coarse-grained classical measurements, W migrates from the strongest
to the weakest compatibility condition.
V. THREE-PARTY POST-PEIERLS COMPATIBILITY IN THREE
DIMENSIONS
PP seems to be the only one of our compatibility criteria for which there is no simple,
general mathematical condition for deciding whether a given set of density operators is
compatible. For two parties, however, it is easy to determine whether the two density
operators are PP compatible: Mermin [4] showed that PP is satisfied if and only if the
states are not orthogonal, i.e., tr(ρˆAρˆB) 6= 0 or, equivalently, ρˆAρˆB 6= 0. This condition
follows from the fact that two density operators are not PP compatible if and only if there
is a measurement that can distinguish them reliably, and there is such a measurement if and
only if the two density operators are orthogonal. This two-party PP compatibility condition
is the same for ODOPs and POVMs, as can be shown directly [4] or from the fact that as an
ODOP condition, it is independent of the dimension of the Hilbert space in which the two
states are embedded. Notice that if any two parties assign PP incompatible states, then the
states of all parties are PP-ODOP and PP-POVM incompatible.
In three or more Hilbert-space dimensions, the general condition for N states to be PP
compatible, relative to ODOPs or to POVMs, is highly nontrivial. We report results in this
section for the first interesting situation, three parties assigning states in three Hilbert-space
dimensions. As noted above, full-rank density operators are irrelevant to questions of PP
compatibility, so we can assume that all the density operators are either rank-one or rank-
two. There are four cases to consider, depending on how many of the states are pure. We
consider the three cases where one or more of the states is mixed in Sec. VA and deal with
the case of three pure states in Sec. VB.
A. Mixed and pure states
Throughout this subsection, we investigate the conditions for constructing POVMs (or
ODOPs) that show that the density operators are PP incompatible. Such a POVM (or
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ODOP) must be made up of the operators that give zero probability for each density op-
erator in turn. In doing this construction, we adopt the following conventions. If ρˆα is
a rank-two density operator, we let Sα denote the two-dimensional subspace that is the
support of ρˆα, with Sˆα being the projector onto Sα, and we let Πˆα = |eα〉〈eα| be the one-
dimensional projection operator that projects orthogonal to Sα. A POVM element that has
zero probability given ρˆα must have the form Eˆα = rαΠˆα, 0 ≤ rα ≤ 1; if the POVM is to be
an ODOP, we need rα = 1 or rα = 0. If ρˆα = |ψα〉〈ψα| is a rank-one density operator, we let
Eˆα = rα,1Πˆα,1 + rα,2Πˆα,2 = rα,1|eα,1〉〈eα,1|+ rα,2|eα,2〉〈eα,2| , 0 ≤ rα,1, rα,2 ≤ 1 , (14)
denote the general POVM element orthogonal to ρˆα; its eigenvectors |eα,1〉 and |eα,2〉 are
orthogonal to |ψα〉. A POVM element that has zero probability given ρˆα must have the
form (14). The operators Eˆα,j = rα,jΠˆα,j, j = 1, 2, are rank-one POVM elements that give
a fine graining of Eˆα. If the POVM is to be an ODOP, we must have rα,j = 1 or rα,j = 0.
The first (and easiest) case is that of three rank-two density operators ρˆα. A POVM each
of whose outcomes contradicts at least one of the parties must consist of positive multiples
of the projectors Πˆα. The only way three such POVM elements can sum to 1ˆ is if they are
orthogonal projectors (an ODOP). Thus we have that three rank-two density operators in
three dimensions are PP-POVM incompatible if and only if the vectors orthogonal to their
supports are mutually orthogonal. Since the measurement that reveals incompatibility is an
ODOP, there is no difference between PP-POVM and PP-ODOP for this case.
A straightforward way to generalize from two parties is to say that N > 2 density
operators are pairwise PP compatible if ρˆαρˆβ 6= 0 for all pairs α, β. Though PP-POVM or
PP-ODOP clearly implies pairwise PP, the converse does not hold, as is plain from the three
states
ρˆ1 =
1
2
(|e2〉〈e2|+ |e3〉〈e3|) ,
ρˆ2 =
1
2
(|e1〉〈e1|+ |e3〉〈e3|) , (15)
ρˆ3 =
1
2
(|e1〉〈e1|+ |e2〉〈e2|) ,
which are pairwise PP compatible even though they are PP incompatible when considered
together.
The next case is that of one pure state ρˆ1 = |ψ1〉〈ψ1| and two rank-two density operators,
ρˆ2 and ρˆ3. If ρˆ2 and ρˆ3 have the same support, we are back in the situation of pairwise
PP compatibility, and the three states are PP incompatible if and only if |ψ1〉 is orthogonal
to the common support of ρˆ2 and ρˆ3. Thus assume that ρˆ2 and ρˆ3 do not have the same
support. Then |e2〉 and |e3〉 span a two-dimensional subspace R; denote the projector onto
R by Rˆ. Let |χ〉 be the unique (up to a phase) pure state that lies in the intersection of S2
and S3; |χ〉 is orthogonal to R. In addition, let |φα〉, α = 2, 3, be the unique (up to a phase)
pure state in Sα that is orthogonal to |χ〉; |φ2〉 and |φ3〉 lie in R.
With this setup, we can turn to formulating the conditions for the existence of a POVM
that shows the density operators are incompatible. Such a POVM must consist of the
POVM elements Eˆα defined above. Since only Eˆ1 has support outside R, the only way the
POVM elements can sum to 1ˆ is to have |χ〉 be an eigenvector of Eˆ1 with eigenvalue 1, i.e.,
|e1,1〉 = |χ〉 and r1,1 = 1. Consequently, |ψ1〉 and |e1,2〉 are orthogonal vectors in R, and
Eˆ1,2 = r1,2|e1,2〉〈e1,2| is a rank-one POVM element that acts only in R. The only remaining
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requirement is that Rˆ = Eˆ1,2 + Eˆ2 + Eˆ3. This means that we are back to the question
of constructing a POVM in two dimensions, here the two-dimensional subspace R. What
we have shown is that the PP incompatibility of the original three states is equivalent to
the PP incompatibility of the three pure states |ψ1〉, |φ2〉, and |φ3〉, all of which lie in the
two-dimensional subspace R.
Our conclusion is the following. The three states |ψ1〉, ρ2, and ρ3, with S2 6= S3, are
PP-POVM incompatible if and only if 〈ψ1|χ〉 = 0 and the convex set generated by |ψ1〉〈ψ1|,
|φ2〉〈φ2|, and |φ3〉〈φ3| contains Rˆ/2. Similarly, the three states are PP-ODOP incompatible
if and only if 〈ψ1|χ〉 = 0 and two of the states |ψ1〉, |φ2〉, and |φ3〉 are orthogonal.
The third case is that of two pure states, ρˆ1 = |ψ1〉〈ψ1| and ρˆ2 = |ψ2〉〈ψ2|, and one
rank-two density operator ρˆ3. We have not been able to determine the conditions for PP-
POVM compatibility in this case, so we restrict ourselves to PP-ODOP compatibility. One
projector in an ODOP that reveals the incompatibility of these states must be Πˆ3 = |e3〉〈e3|.
The other two elements of the ODOP, Πˆ1 = |e1〉〈e1| and Πˆ2 = |e2〉〈e2| must operate in S3.
The states they contradict must be orthogonal to them. Thus |ψ1〉 must lie in the subspace
spanned by |e3〉 and |e2〉, and its projection onto S3, i.e., Sˆ3|ψ1〉, must be proportional to
|e2〉. Similarly, |ψ2〉 must lie in the subspace spanned by |e3〉 and |e1〉, and its projection
onto S3, i.e., Sˆ3|ψ2〉, must be proportional to |e1〉. Our conclusion is that the three states
are PP-ODOP incompatible if and only 〈ψ1|Sˆ3|ψ2〉 = 0.
B. Three pure states
The final case is that of three pure states in three dimensions. Again we have not been able
to prove the conditions for PP-POVM compatibility, although we have numerical evidence
that PP-POVM is equivalent PP-ODOP for this case. We restrict our attention in this
subsection to ODOPs.
We can assume that the states are all different, since if two are the same, we are back in
the two-party case. Moreover, since not being pairwise PP compatible implies not being PP
compatible, the interesting case is where the three states are pairwise PP compatible, i.e.,
no pair is orthogonal. Thus we address the following question: under what circumstances is
there an ODOP whose outcome will definitely contradict one of three distinct, nonorthog-
onal pure states? The criterion we derive is interesting in its own right, independent of
compatibility considerations.
Let |ψ1〉, |ψ2〉, and |ψ3〉 be the three distinct, normalized, pairwise PP compatible, pure
states, i.e.,
0 < |〈ψ1|ψ2〉| < 1 ,
0 < |〈ψ2|ψ3〉| < 1 , (16)
0 < |〈ψ3|ψ1〉| < 1 .
The vectors |ψ1〉, |ψ2〉, and |ψ3〉 violate PP-ODOP if and only if there exist angles θk,
0 < θk < π/2, k = 1, 2, 3, such that
a ≡ |〈ψ1|ψ2〉|
2 = (sin θ1 cos θ2)
2 ,
b ≡ |〈ψ2|ψ3〉|
2 = (sin θ2 cos θ3)
2 , (17)
c ≡ |〈ψ3|ψ1〉|
2 = (sin θ3 cos θ1)
2 .
13
These conditions can be seen as follows. If the vectors violate PP-ODOP, there exists an
orthonormal basis {|1〉, |2〉, |3〉} for the space spanned by |ψ1〉, |ψ2〉, and |ψ3〉 such that
|ψ1〉 = e
iχ1(cos θ1|2〉+ e
iφ1 sin θ1|3〉) ,
|ψ2〉 = e
iχ2(cos θ2|3〉+ e
iφ2 sin θ2|1〉) , (18)
|ψ3〉 = e
iχ3(cos θ3|1〉+ e
iφ3 sin θ3|2〉) ,
where 0 ≤ χk < 2π, 0 ≤ φk < 2π, 0 < θk < π/2 (k = 1, 2, 3). Taking the inner products, we
see that
〈ψ1|ψ2〉 = e
i(χ2−χ1)eiφ1 sin θ1 cos θ2 ,
〈ψ2|ψ3〉 = e
i(χ3−χ2)eiφ2 sin θ2 cos θ3 , (19)
〈ψ3|ψ1〉 = e
i(χ1−χ3)eiφ3 sin θ3 cos θ1 .
The conditions (17) follow immediately.
Conversely, if the conditions (17) are satisfied, then it is clear that we can find angles χk
and φk such that the inner products 〈ψi|ψj〉 are given by Eqs. (19). Since the pairwise inner
products specify the vectors up to a unitary transformation, there exists an orthonormal
basis {|1〉, |2〉, |3〉} such that |ψ1〉, |ψ2〉, and |ψ3〉 have the form (18). A measurement in this
basis shows that the vectors are PP-ODOP incompatible.
To find a simpler criterion, define xk = sin
2 θk for k = 1, 2, 3. The equations (17) are then
equivalent to
x1(1− x2) = a ,
x2(1− x3) = b , (20)
x3(1− x1) = c .
Solving these equations for, e.g., x2, we obtain
x2 =
1− a + b− c±
√
(1− a+ b− c)2 − 4b(1− a)(1− c)
2(1− c)
=
1− a + b− c±
√
(a+ b+ c− 1)2 − 4abc
2(1− c)
; (21)
the expressions for x3 and x1 follow from cyclic permutations of a, b and c. Equations (17)
are equivalent to the existence of solutions that satisfy 0 < xk < 1 for k = 1, 2, 3. The first
equality in Eq. (21) shows that, if there are two real solutions, both have the same sign.
The existence of a solution 0 < x2 < 1 is thus equivalent to the following three conditions:
1− a+ b− c > 0 , (22)
(a+ b+ c− 1)2 > 4abc , (23)
1− a+ b− c−
√
(a+ b+ c− 1)2 − 4abc < 2(1− c) . (24)
The third of these conditions is equivalent to
− (1− b+ a− c) <
√
(a+ b+ c− 1)2 − 4abc . (25)
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This is implied by the condition 1 − b + a − c > 0, which is a cyclic permutation of the
inequality (22). The full set of conditions is therefore
1− a+ b− c > 0 ,
1− b+ c− a > 0 ,
1− c+ a− b > 0 ,
(a + b+ c− 1)2 > 4abc . (26)
An equivalent form is
|a− b| < 1− c ,
a+ b < 1 + c , (27)
(a+ b− 1)2
c
+
(a− b)2
(1− c)
> 1 .
For fixed c, with 0 < c < 1, it is straightforward to show that the ellipse in the a-b plane
defined by the last inequality has the following properties: it is centered at the point a =
b = 1/2, and its principal axes, of length
√
c/2 and
√
(1− c)/2, form angles of 45◦ with the a
and b axes. The ellipse has exactly one point of intersection with the a axis at a = 1− c and
exactly one point of intersection with the b axis at b = 1− c. The ellipse and the associated
region of PP-ODOP incompatibility are shown in Fig. 1.
From this it can be seen that the conditions (27) are equivalent to the following, final set
of conditions,
a+ b+ c < 1 ,
(a+ b+ c− 1)2 > 4abc , (28)
which are manifestly symmetric in the three squared inner products, a, b, and c. To sum-
marize, the three pure states are PP-ODOP incompatible if and only if their pairwise inner
products satisfy the conditions (28).
VI. DISCUSSION
We have shown that the BFM criterion can be viewed as one member in a hierarchy of
five compatibility criteria for quantum state assignments. Parties whose state assignments
are BFM compatible can come to agreement about a joint state assignment without any
party having to abandon a firm prior belief. By contrast, the four other criteria are based
on measurements. They all have distinct roles, and none is equivalent to BFM.
The ES criterion can be applied to a situation where all parties have shared their available
information. They may still assign different states, but they agree on the nullspace. The
states assigned by the different parties all have the same support.
The PP criterion rules out the possibility of a measurement that all parties agree will,
regardless of outcome, contradict one of their state assignments. In other words, if the states
assigned by the parties are not PP compatible, then there exists a measurement that will
definitely reveal disagreement among the parties. The PP criterion is in some ways the most
interesting: it puts nontrivial constraints on the set of density operators, and it depends on
15
b
1
1-c
0
a11-c0
FIG. 1: Three pure states in three dimensions, |ψ1〉, |ψ2〉, and |ψ3〉, are PP-ODOP incompatible
if there exists a measurement described by three one-dimensional, orthogonal projectors such that
each outcome rules out at least one of the three states. The incompatibility of the states depends
only on the three squared inner products. For a fixed value of one squared inner product, c =
|〈ψ3|ψ1〉|
2, the plot shows the region of PP-ODOP incompatibility in terms of the other two squared
inner products, a = |〈ψ1|ψ2〉|
2 and b = |〈ψ2|ψ3〉|
2. The ellipse is defined in Eq. (27). The region of
a and b corresponding to PP-ODOP incompatible states, indicated by cross-hatching, lies between
the ellipse and the axes.
whether all generalized measurements, described by POVMs, are allowed or the permitted
measurements are restricted to ODOPs.
The W criterion (which is equivalent to W′) shows that there is no strictly necessary
constraint on a finite set of density operators to be compatible. Any such set is compatible
in the sense that there exists a measurement that allows the parties to come to agreement.
In this sense, the BFM criterion is neither sufficient nor necessary.
It turns out that there are important differences between the classical and quantum
cases. Whereas the BFM criterion is stronger than the PP criterion quantum-mechanically,
the two are equivalent classically. Curiously, the criterion W, which is the weakest quantum-
mechanically, is the strongest classically, at least for fine-grained (ODOP) measurements.
Finally, we identify strong Dutch-book consistency as a necessary assumption in the
derivation of the BFM criterion. In particular, we show that N parties who violate strong
Dutch-book consistency might come to agreement about a joint state assignment without
abandoning any of their firm prior beliefs, even if their prior state assignments are not BFM
consistent.
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APPENDIX A: BAYESIAN PROBABILITIES AND THE DUTCH-BOOK
ARGUMENT
Bayesian probabilities are a measure of one’s degree of belief in or, equivalently, one’s
degree of uncertainty about the various alternatives in a set [5]. Bayesian probabilities receive
an operational definition in decision theory [11], i.e., the theory of how to decide in the face
of uncertainty. The Bayesian approach captures naturally the notion that probabilities
represent one’s beliefs about a set of alternatives.
The simplest operational definition of Bayesian probabilities is in terms of betting be-
havior, which is decision theory in a nutshell. To formulate this definition, let A be a bettor
who is willing to place a bet at odds of (1−p)/p to 1 on the occurrence of an event E. These
odds mean that A is willing to pay in an amount px—the stake—up front, with the promise
of receiving an amount x—the payoff—if E occurs and nothing otherwise. To say that A
considers this a fair bet is to say that she is willing to accept the bet at these odds no matter
what the payoff; in particular, the payoff can be either positive or negative, meaning that
A is willing to accept either side of the bet. This situation is used to define probabilities:
that A considers it fair to bet on E at odds of (1− p)/p to 1 is the operational definition of
A’s assigning probability p to the occurrence of event E.
The bookmaker who accepts the stakes and makes the payoffs is called the Dutch bookie.
In a betting situation with A, he has the freedom to set the payoffs for the various out-
comes at will. A’s probability assignment to the outcomes of a betting situation is called
inconsistent if it forces her to accept bets on which she loses for every outcome that she
deems possible. A probability assignment is called consistent (or Dutch-book consistent,
often called coherent in the literature) if it is not inconsistent in this sense. Remark-
ably, requiring consistent behavior implies that A must obey the standard probability
rules in her probability assignments: (i) p ≥ 0, (ii) p(E) = 1 if A believes that E is
certain to occur, (iii) p(E ∨ F ) = p(E) + p(F ) if E and F are mutually exclusive, and
(iv) p(E ∧ F ) = p(E|F )p(F ) (Bayes’s rule). A probability assignment that violates any of
these rules is inconsistent in the above sense. This is the so-called Dutch-book argument [6, 7],
which we review below. We stress that it does not invoke expectation values or averages
over repeated bets; a bettor who violates the probability rules places bets that, according
to her own assessment of what is possible, will result in a sure loss in a single instance of
the betting situation.
Consider first the situation where A assigns probability pE to E’s occurring and proba-
bility p¬E to E’s not occurring (symbolized by ¬E). This means that she will accept a bet
on E with payoff xE (stake pExE) and a bet on ¬E with payoff x¬E (stake p¬Ex¬E). The
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net amount A receives is
G =
{
xE(1− pE)− x¬Ep¬E if E occurs,
−xEpE + x¬E(1− p¬E) if E does not occur.
(A1)
The Dutch bookie can always choose x¬E = 0, in which case A’s gains become G = xE(1−pE)
if E occurs and G = −xEpE if E does not occur. To avoid all-negative gains requires that
1− pE and pE have the same sign, which implies 0 ≤ pE ≤ 1, thus giving rule (i).
Suppose now that A believes that E is certain to occur. For the only outcome she deems
possible, her gain is G = xE(1− pE)− x¬Ep¬E. The Dutch bookie can arrange this gain to
have any value—in particular, any negative value by choosing xE < 0 and x¬E > 0—unless
pE = 1 and p¬E = 0. The result is rule (ii): an outcome thought certain to occur must
be assigned probability 1 (and an outcome thought certain not to occur must be assigned
probability 0).
Now consider two mutually exclusive events, E and F , and suppose A assigns probabilities
pE , pF , and pE∨F to the three outcomes E, F , and E ∨ F (E or F ). This means A will
accept the following three bets: a bet on E with payoff xE (stake pExE); a bet on F with
payoff xF (stake pFxF ); and a bet on E ∨ F with payoff xE∨F (stake pE∨FxE∨F ). The net
amount A receives is
G =


xE(1− pE)− xFpF + xE∨F (1− pE∨F ) if E, but not F occurs,
−xEpE + xF (1− pF ) + xE∨F (1− pE∨F ) if F , but not E occurs,
−xEpE − xFpF − xE∨FpE∨F if neither E nor F occurs.
(A2)
We need not consider the possibility that both E and F occur, since they are mutually
exclusive. The Dutch bookie can choose payoffs xE , xF , and xE∨F that lead to G < 0 for all
three outcomes unless
0 = det


1− pE −pF 1− pE∨F
−pE 1− pF 1− pE∨F
−pE −pF −pE∨F

 = pE + pF − pE∨F . (A3)
The probability assignment is thus inconsistent unless rule (iii) is satisfied, i.e., pE∨F =
pE + pF .
Finally, we consider two events, E and F , which are not necessarily exclusive. Suppose
that A assigns probability pF to the occurrence of F , probability pE∧F to the occurrence of
E ∧ F (E and F ), and conditional probability pE|F to the occurrence of E, given that F
has occurred. This means A will accept the following three bets: a bet on F with payoff xF
(stake pFxF ); a bet on E ∧ F with payoff xE∧F (stake pE∧FxE∧F ); and a conditional bet on
E given that F has occurred, the payoff being xE|F (stake pE|FxE|F ). If F does not occur,
the conditional bet is called off, with the stake returned. The net amount A receives is
G =


−xFpF − xE∧FpE∧F if F does not occur,
xF (1− pF )− xE∧FpE∧F − xE|FpE|F if F , but not E occurs,
xF (1− pF ) + xE∧F (1− pE∧F ) + xE|F (1− pE|F ) if both E and F occur.
(A4)
The Dutch bookie can choose payoffs xF , xE∧F , and xE|F that lead to G < 0 for all three
outcomes unless
0 = det


−pF −pE∧F 0
1− pF −pE∧F −pE|F
1− pF 1− pE∧F 1− pE|F

 = −pE|FpE + pE∧F . (A5)
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Consistency thus requires that Bayes’s rule be satisfied, i.e., pE∧F = pE|FpF .
In our experience most physicists find it difficult first to accept and then to embrace the
notion that Bayesian probabilities receive their only operational significance from decision
theory, the simplest realization of which is the Dutch-book argument in which probabili-
ties are defined in terms of betting odds for fair bets. In the Dutch-book approach, the
structure of probability theory follows solely from the requirement of consistent betting
behavior. There is no other input to the theory. It is worth emphasizing, for example,
that normalization is not a separate assumption, so trivial that it requires no justification.
Rather it is a consequence of Dutch-book consistency, specifically of rules (ii) and (iii), i.e.,
1 = p(E ∨ ¬E) = p(E) + p(¬E).
Surprisingly, consistency does not imply the converse of rule (ii); i.e., we cannot conclude
from consistency alone that if pE = 1, then A believes that E is certain to occur. To
see this, return to Eq. (A2), specializing to pE = 1 and p¬E = 0 (the latter required by
normalization):
G =
{
0 if E occurs,
−xE + x¬E if E does not occur.
(A6)
We can get no further with consistency because the zero gain for outcome E ensures that
A cannot be put in a situation where all gains are negative.
To go further, we need the notion of strong consistency [8, 9] (or strong Dutch-book
consistency, often called strong or strict coherence in the literature): A’s probability assign-
ment is said to be inconsistent in the strong sense if she can be forced to accept bets on
which, for outcomes she deems possible, no gain is positive, but some gains are negative
(she never wins, but sometimes loses); a probability assignment is strongly consistent if it
is not inconsistent in the strong sense. Since in Eq. (A6) the second gain can be made
negative, strong consistency implies that A must believe that E is certain to occur. Thus
strong consistency requires that p = 1 be assigned only to events thought certain to occur
(and p = 0 be assigned only to events thought certain not to occur).
Dutch-book consistency requires a bettor to follow the standard probability rules. That
following the rules is sufficient to avoid inconsistency has been shown by Kemeny [9]. Ke-
meny reduces the most general betting situation to combinations of conditional bets, as in
Eq. (A4), and bets on exclusive alternatives, as in Eq. (A2), and he then shows that the
expected gain for each of these kinds of bets is zero for probabilities that satisfy the standard
rules. The expected gain for bets on the exclusive alternatives in Eq. (A2) is
pE[xE(1− pE)− xFpF + xE∨F (1− pE∨F )] + pF [−xEpE + xF (1− pF ) + xE∨F (1− pE∨F )]
+(1− pE∨F )[−xEpE − xFpF − xE∨FpE∨F ]
= (pE∨F − pE − pF )[pExE + pFxF − (1− pE∨F )xE∨F ] . (A7)
A similar result holds for the conditional bets of Eq. (A4):
(1− pF )[−xF pF − xE∧FpE∧F ] + (1− pE|F )pF [xF (1− pF )− xE∧FpE∧F − xE|FpE|F ]
+pE∧F [xF (1− pF ) + xE∧F (1− pE∧F ) + xE|F (1− pE|F )]
= (pE∧F − pE|FpF )[(1− pF )xF + (1− pE|F )xE|F − pE∧FxE∧F ] . (A8)
Since the expected gains are zero for probabilities that satisfy the standard rules, it is
impossible to have all-negative gains (or, in the case of strong consistency, for those outcomes
the bettor deems possible, to have gains some of which are negative with the rest being zero).
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Unlike an ordinary bookie, who tries to balance wins and losses and makes money off
the fees charged for handling the bets, a Dutch bookie exploits inconsistencies in a bettor’s
behavior to win under all circumstances (or never to lose, yet sometimes win in the case
of strong consistency). To avoid inconsistency, a bettor simply has to follow the rules of
probability theory. The Dutch-book argument is not about a contest between a bettor and
a Dutch bookie. It is wholly about the internal consistency of the way a bettor translates
beliefs into probability assignments. The Dutch bookie is simply the agent who exposes
inconsistencies in the bettor’s behavior.
In keeping with the notion that probabilities are subjective, the Dutch-book argument
does not dictate a bettor’s probability assignments, which are based on whatever the bettor
believes or knows about the situation at hand. The only exception occurs in the case where
the bettor is certain. Then Dutch-book consistency requires that all her probabilities be 0
or 1. For quantum mechanics, this means that when a bettor is certain about the outcome
of some ODOP, she must assign the pure state corresponding to the certain outcome. Only
if the bettor is strongly consistent, however, can we conclude that a pure-state assignment
means that the better is certain about the outcome of an ODOP that includes the pure
state among its outcomes, and this conclusion is crucial for all the compatibility criteria
developed in this paper.
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